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Characterizing the Adversarial Power in Uniform and Ergodic
Peer Sampling
Emmanuelle Anceaume* Yann Busnel** Se´bastien Gambs***
Abstract: We consider the problem of achieving uniform and ergodic peer sampling in
large scale open systems under adversarial behavior. The main challenge is to guarantee that
any honest peer is able to construct a uniform and non-definitive (ergodic) sample of the peers
identifiers in the system, and this even in the presence of Byzantine peers controlled by the
adversary. This sample is built out of a stream of peer identifiers received at each node. We
consider and study two types of adversary; an omniscient adversary that has the capacity to
eavesdrop on all the messages that are exchanged within the system, and a blind adversary
that can only observe messages that have been sent or received by peers he controls. In both
models, the adversary can disrupt the input stream by injecting new messages or dropping
messages sent by honest peers. Given any sampling strategy, we quantify the minimum
effort an adversary has to exert on any input stream to prevent the sampling strategy from
outputting a uniform and ergodic sample. We derive lower bounds for both adversary models.
Key-words: Uniform and ergodic sampling, unstructured P2P, Byzantine adversary.
Caracte´risation de la puissance d’un adversaire: application a` un service
d’e´chantillonnage uniforme et ergodique
Re´sume´ : Nous conside´rons le proble`me de la mise en œuvre d’un service d’e´chantillonnage
de nœuds uniforme et ergodic dans des syste`mes distribue´s a` tre`s grande e`chelle soumis a`
l’influence d’un adversaire malveillant. Nous e´tudions deux types d’adversaire : un adver-
saire omniscient qui est capable d’espionner tous les messages e´change´s a` travers les liens
de communication du syste`me, et un adversaire aveugle, qui ne peut observer que les mes-
sages transitants par les nœuds sous son controˆle. Dans chacun de ces mode`les, l’adversaire
peut perturber le flux entrant de chaque nœud par l’injection ou l’effacement de messages.
Nous quantifions l’effort minimum qu’un adversaire doit exercer pour empeˆcher la strate´gie
d’e´chantillonnage de ge´ne´rer un e´chantillon uniforme et ergodique. Enfin, nous de´rivons des
bornes infe´rieures pour chacun des mode`les d’adversaire conside´re´s.
Mots cle´s : Echantillonnage uniforme et ergodic, P2P non structure´s, adversaire byzantin
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1 Introduction
We investigate the problem of achieving uniform and ergodic peer sampling in large scale
open systems in presence of adversarial nodes. Uniform sampling is a fundamental primitive
ensuring that any individual in a population has the same probability to be selected as
sample. Uniform sampling finds its root in many practical problems such as data collection,
dissemination, load balancing and data-caching [5, 11, 13, 16] but achieving uniform sampling
in large scale open systems has been shown to be difficult. One of the reasons for this is that
the population of these systems is typically very large (e.g., thousand or millions of peers) and
displays a very high churn (recent studies on the eDonkey file-sharing network have shown that
in average 500, 000 peers connect and disconnect per day [14]). Moreover, openness makes
unavoidable the presence of adversaries controlling a high number of peers. These adversaries
strategize to isolate honest peers within the system by violating randomness assumptions that
are at the core of these systems1.
By relying on the topological properties of structured peer-to-peer systems, it has been
shown that it is possible to guarantee that with high probability any peer is equally likely
to appear in the local view of each other honest peer in a number of communication rounds
polynomial in the size of the system. One way to achieve this is by imposing peers to frequently
depart from their position and move to another random position in the system [2, 4]. In
unstructured peer-to-peer systems, peers cannot rely on the topological nature of structured
graphs to detect undesirable behaviors. To circumvent this issue, Bortnikov et al. [6] have
relied on the properties of min-wise independent permutations, which are fed by the streams of
gossiped peer ids and eventually converge towards uniform sampling on the peer ids. However,
the resulting sample is definitive in the sense that no other peer id received in the input
stream can ever appear in the random sample, which makes this sampling strategy uniform
but not ergodic. Informally, the ergodicity property guarantees that each peer id has a non-
zero probability to appear infinitely often in a sample. A preliminary step in determining
conditions under which uniform and ergodic sampling is achievable in unstructured peer-
to-peer systems potentially populated with a large proportion of Byzantine peers has been
presented in a previous paper [3]. Briefly, it has been shown that imposing strict restrictions on
the number of messages sent by malicious peers during a given period of time and providing
each honest peer with a very large memory (proportional to the size of the system) are
necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain uniform and ergodic sampling.
In this paper, we propose a characterization of the adversarial power towards biasing
uniform and ergodic sampling. By adopting a statistical view of the input stream and by
comparing distributions using metrics such as information divergence, we derive lower bounds
on the work that the adversary has to exert to bias this input stream such that uniform and
ergodic sampling does not hold. We consider and study two models of adversary; the omni-
scient adversary, that has the capacity to eavesdrop on all the messages that are exchanged
within the system, and the blind one that can only observe messages that have been sent or
received by peers he controls (i.e.,the malicious ones). To the best of our knowledge, we are
not aware of any previous work that has specified and characterized the conditions for which
uniform and ergodic sampling is achievable in the presence of adversarial behavior.
1Scalability of structured peer-to-peer systems rely on the assumption that nodes are uniformly distributed
over the structured communication graph, while connectivity of unstructured peer-to-peer systems result from
the assumption that nodes choose their neighbors arbitrarily.
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The outline of this paper is the following. In Section 2, we give an overview of the existing
related work, whereas Section 3 describes the model of the system and the particular assump-
tions that we make. In Section 4, we describe the functionalities of a sampling component
and the properties that it should guarantee while in Section 5, we present some background
on information divergence of data-streams. The omniscient and blind adversary models, as
well as the characterization of the minimum effort the adversary has to exert to bias the
sampling properties, are respectively studied in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, Section 8 presents
some concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
Different approaches have been proposed to deal with malicious behaviors in the peer sampling
problem in unstructured overlays. Jesi et al. [12] propose a random sampling algorithm taking
explicitly into account malicious peers. Their solution assumes that the ultimate goal of the
malicious peers is to mutate the random graph into a hub-based graph, hub for which malicious
peers gain the lead. This approach, also adopted in several structured based overlays [19]
through auditing mechanisms, or in sensor networks [15], is effective only if the number of
malicious peers is very small with respect to the size of the system (i.e., typically of O(log n)).
Recently, Bortnikov et al. [6] have proposed a uniform but not ergodic peer sampling algorithm
that tolerates up to a linear number of malicious peers. Their sampling mechanism exploits
the properties offered by min-wise permutations. Specifically, the sampling component is fed
with the stream of peer ids periodically gossiped by peers, and outputs the peer id whose image
value under the randomly chosen permutation is the smallest value ever encountered. Thus
eventually, by the property of min-wise permutation, the sampler converges towards a random
but permanent sample. In a previous work [3], we show that imposing strict restrictions on the
number of messages sent by malicious peers during a given period of time and providing each
honest peer with a very large memory (proportional to the size of the system) are necessary
and sufficient conditions to obtain uniform and ergodic (non permanent) sampling. It is
worth noting that our results complement two previous results [7, 10], in which an analysis
of the class of uniform and ergodic sampling protocols is presented. Both previous work
provide a complete analytical proof of a gossip-based protocol that reaches both uniformity
and ergodicity, but in contrast to the present work, adversarial behaviors were not considered.
Finally, taking a completely different approach from the previously mentioned papers, which
are based on gossip algorithms or on distance function properties, the techniques presented
in [20, 21] rely on social network topologies to guard against Sybil attacks. Both protocols
take advantage of the fact that Sybil attacks try to alter the fast mixing property of social
networks to defend against these attacks. However, in presence of malicious peers with a high
degree, the performance of both protocols degrade drastically.
3 System Model
Model of the Network. We consider a system populated by a large collection of peers
in which each peer is assigned a unique and permanent random identifier from an m-bit
identifier space. Peer identifiers (simply denoted ids in the following) are derived by applying
some standard strong cryptographic hash function on peers intrinsic characteristics. The
value of m (128 for the standard MD5 hash function) is chosen to be large enough to make
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the probability of identifiers collision negligible. The system is subject to churn, which is
classically defined as the rate of turnover of peers in the system [9]. Each peer knows only a
small set of peers existing within the system and this knowledge generally varies according to
the activity of the system. The particular algorithm used by peers to choose their neighbors
and to route messages induces the resulting overlay topology. In this work, we consider only
an unstructured overlay. Unstructured overlays are assumed to conform with random graphs,
in the sense that relationships among peers are mostly set according to a random process.
Note that in the following we indifferently use both terms node and peer.
Adversary. We assume the presence of malicious (i.e., Byzantine) peers that try to
manipulate the system by exhibiting undesirable behaviors. In our context, this amounts to
dropping chosen messages and injecting new ones to bias the sample list maintained by non
malicious peers. We model malicious behaviors through an adversary that fully controls these
malicious peers. The adversary cannot control more than a fraction k (0 < k < 1) of malicious
peers in the whole system. A node that is not malicious is said honest. We distinguish between
two models of adversary. The omniscient adversary model that represents an adversary that
is able to eavesdrop all messages exchanged within the system, and the blind adversary model
that represents an adversary that can only observe messages sent or received by malicious
nodes. In both models, we assume that the adversary cannot tamper with the content a
message exchanged between two honest nodes without being detected. This is achieved by
the means of a signature scheme that ensures the authenticity and integrity of messages.
Sampling Assumptions. Similarly to Bortnikov et al. [6], we assume that there exists
a time T0 such that after that time, the churn of the system ceases. This assumption is
necessary to make the notion of uniform sample meaningful. Thus from T0 onwards, the
population of the system S is composed of n  2m nodes, such that at least (1 − k)n of
them are honest and no more than kn of them are controlled by the adversary. The subset
of honest nodes in the overlay is denoted by N and we assume that all the nodes in N are
weakly connected from time T0 onwards.
4 Sampling Component
Following the lines of [3], each node u ∈ N has locally access to a sampling component2 as
presented in Figure 1. The sampling component implements a strategy s and has uniquely
access to a data structure Γu, referred to as the sampling memory. The size of the sampling
memory Γu is bounded and is denoted by |Γu|. The sampling component Ssu is fed with
a stream < vi, vj , . . . > of (possibly non unique) node ids that correspond to the node ids
periodically received by node u ∈ N (e.g., through gossip algorithms, or random walks for
instance). The fingerprint of an input stream is a collection of weighted points in which each
node id is weighted by the number of times this node id appears in the stream. Specifically,
a stream of node ids can be summarized by < (v1,m1), . . . , (vn,mn) >, where vi denotes the
identifier of a node in S and mi ∈ N represents the number of times vi appears in the stream.
At each time t, the following three steps are atomically executed: the first element of the
stream, say node id v, is given as input to the sampler component. The sampling component
Ssu reads v, and removes it from the stream. According to its strategy s, S
s
u may store or not
v in Γu and outputs at most one node id. For example, the strategy s may consist in storing
2Although malicious nodes have also access to a sampling component, we cannot impose any assumptions
on how they feed it or use it as their behavior can be totally arbitrary.
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ids stream S  (t)usSus
Γ u
Figure 1: Sampling component of node u ∈ N .
v if Γu is not full, or in substituting v for a randomly chosen node id that belongs to Γu, or in
simply dropping v. The output at time t, denoted Ssu(t), is chosen among the node ids in Γu
according to strategy s. For instance, strategy s may consist in choosing the smallest node id
in Γu, or the smallest node id under a given min-wise permutation [6]. The maximum finite
hitting time needed for the sampling component Ssu to reach a uniform sample is denoted
by Ts. Clearly, Ts depends on the strategy s implemented by the sampling component and
also on the stream of node ids the sampling component is fed with. We assume that the
sampling strategy is known by the adversary in the sense that the algorithm used is public
knowledge. However, if the algorithm is a randomized one, the adversary has not access to
the local random coins used by the honest peers.
Finally, δ represents the number of node ids injected by the adversary in the input stream
of node u during the time interval Ts. Note that it does not matter whether the injected node
ids correspond to the ids of malicious nodes or not as the unique goal of the adversary is to
bias the input stream in such a way that whatever the strategy s of the sampler component,
its output Ssu(t) cannot guarantee both the uniform and ergodic properties [3]. More precisely,
these properties are defined as follows
Property 4.1 (Uniformity) Let N be a weakly connected graph from time T0 onwards, then
for any time t ≥ Ts, for any node v ∈ S, and for any node u ∈ N ,
P[v ∈ Ssu(t)] =
1
|S| .
Property 4.2 (Ergodicity) Let N be a weakly connected graph from time T0 onwards, then
for any time t ≥ Ts, for any node v ∈ S, and for any node u ∈ N ,
P
[{t′|t′ > t ∧ v ∈ Ssu(t′)} = ∅] = 0,
where ∅ represents the empty set.
Uniformity states that any node in the overlay should have the same probability to appear
in the sample of honest nodes in the overlay, while ergodicity says that any node should have
a non-zero probability to appear infinitely often in the sample of each honest node in the
overlay. Note that uniformity by itself does not imply ergodicity, and vice versa. Indeed, the
former does not impose any restriction on the freshness of output node ids, while the latter
one does not provide any guarantee regarding the equiprobability of node ids to be chosen as
samples. Moreover, as each node v in S has a non-zero probability to be returned by Ssu(t)
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at time t, u must appear at least once in the input stream. Thus, ∀v ∈ S, starting from time
Ts, mv > 0.
Note that the analysis presented in this paper is independent from the way the stream
of node ids at each node u has been generated. That is, it may result from the propagation
of node ids through gossip-based algorithms (namely through push, or pull or push-pull
mechanisms initiated by u and its neighbors), from the node ids received during random
walks initiated at u, or even from induced churn.
5 Information Divergence of Data Streams
A natural approach to detect changes on data streams is to model it as a distribution and
to compute the distance between the observed stream and the ideal one. The distance we
use in our context is the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence (sometimes called the relative
entropy [8]).
Definition 5.1 (Kullback-Liebler divergence) Given two probability distributions on events
p = {p1, . . . , pn} and q = {q1, . . . , qn}, the Kullback-Liebler divergence between pi relative to
qi is defined as the expected value of the likelihood ratio with respect to qi:
D(p||q) =
n∑
i=1
pi log2
pi
qi
(1)
= H(p, q)−H(p), (2)
where H(p) = −∑ pi log2 pi is the (Shannon) entropy of p and H(p, q) = −∑ pi log2 qi is the
cross entropy of p and q (by convention, 0 log2 0 = 0).
The KL-divergence is a member of a larger class of distances known as the Ali-Silvey
distances [1]. For the sake of clarity, we will use the notation log to denote the logarithm in
base 2 for the rest of this paper.
Definition 5.2 (τ-closeness) A stream of node ids σ is τ -close if the KL-divergence between
the uniform probability distribution p(U) and the probability distribution q corresponding to σ
is below or equal to a robustness threshold τ .
Given two probability distributions, the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [18] measures
the minimal amount of work needed to transform one distribution to another by moving
the probability mass between events. We rely on this metric to quantify the effort that an
adversary exerts to bias the input stream. In our context, a unit of work corresponds to
dropping one id and to pushing another id instead in the input stream.
6 Omniscient Adversary Model
In this section, we study the behavior of an omniscient adversary, which has the capacity
to eavesdrop on all the messages sent and received by all the nodes in S. In the following,
we demonstrate that the strategy that pushes all the probability mass over a single id is the
one that maximizes the bias of the input stream so that it becomes far from the uniform
distribution. We also describe an optimal strategy on how to achieve it.
Collection des Publications Internes de l’Irisa c©IRISA
Characterizing the Adversarial Power in Uniform and Ergodic Peer Sampling 7
In the following, we consider input streams of length Ts observed from time T0. Let σ be
a stream such that the id of each node in S appears exactly once in the stream, except for a
unique id that appears in all the remaining slots. Therefore, we have ∃vi ∈ S,mvi = Ts−(n−1)
and ∀vj 6= vi ∈ S,mvj = 1. The following theorem states that the probability distribution
associated to this particular stream is the one that has the maximal divergence from the
uniform distribution. In the following, notation [1. . n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Theorem 6.1 (Maximal divergence from the uniform distribution) Let p(U) be the
uniform distribution corresponding to a uniform stream, i.e., ∀i ∈ [1. . n], p(U)i = 1n , and q
be the probability distribution corresponding to σ, i.e., ∃vi ∈ S, qvi = Ts−(n−1)Ts and ∀vj ∈
S, vj 6= vi, qvj = 1Ts . Then, for any possible probability distribution q,
D(p(U)||q) ≤ D(p(U)||q).
Proof. Let q be the probability distribution representing any valid input stream on (T0, Ts].
We have ∀vi ∈ S, qvi = mviTs , where mvi is the number of times vi is present in the input
stream. Therefore,
D(p(U)||q) = H(p(U), q)−H(p(U)) =
n∑
i=1
p
(U)
i log
(
p
(U)
i
)
−
n∑
i=1
p
(U)
i log
(
mvi
Ts
)
= log
(
Ts
n
)
− 1
n
log
(
n∏
i=1
mvi
)
.
Therefore, maximizing D(p(U)||q) amounts to minimizing log (∏ni=1mvi). We characterize the
stream that minimizes
∏n
i=1mvi under the following constraints:
1 ≤ mvi ≤ Ts with 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
mvi = Ts.
(3)
From this set of constraints, we immediately have 1 ≤ mvi ≤ Ts−(n−1). To relax the second
constraint, we pose mvn = Ts −
n−1∑
i=1
mvi . Let function f be such that
f(mv1 , . . . ,mvn−1) =
(
Ts −
n−1∑
i=1
mvi
)
n−1∏
i=1
mvi = mvj
Ts −mvj − n−1∑
i=1,i 6=j
mvi
 n−1∏
i=1,i 6=j
mvi .
Function f is differentiable on its domain Is = [1. . Ts − n+ 1]n−1, thus we get
df
dmvj
(mv1 , . . . ,mvn−1) =
Ts − 2mvj − n−1∑
i=1,i 6=j
mvi
 n−1∏
i=1,i 6=j
mvi .
We have
df
dmvj
≥ 0⇔ mvj ≤
Ts −
∑n−1
i=1,i 6=jmvi
2
< Ts − (n− 1).
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Function f is then a paraboloid, which first increases then decreases, and then reaches its
minimum on the domain’s boundary. As f is symmetric and all mvj variables are independent,
the minimum for each mvj can be determined separately. The minimum for a particular mvj
is reached when mvj = 1 or mvj = (Ts − n+ 1). That is, f(mv1 , . . . , 1, . . . ,mvn−1) =
∏n−1
i=1,i6=jmvi
(
Ts − 1−
∑n−1
i=1,i6=jmvi
)
f(mv1 , . . . , Ts − n+ 1, . . . ,mvn−1) = (Ts − n+ 1)
∏n−1
i=1,i6=jmvi
(
n− 1−∑n−1i=1,i6=jmvi)
f(mv1 , . . . , Ts − n+ 1, . . . ,mvn−1) =
n−1∏
i=1,i6=j
mvi
(Ts − n+ 1)
n− 2− n−1∑
i=1,i6=j
mvi
+ Ts − n+ 1

=
n−1∏
i=1,i6=j
mvi
(Ts − n)
n− 2− n−1∑
i=1,i6=j
mvi
+ Ts − 1− n−1∑
i=1,i6=j
mvi
 .
As ∀i,mvi ≥ 1, we have n− 2−
∑n−1
i=1,i 6=jmvi ≤ 0. Moreover, as Ts ≥ n, we have
f(mv1 , . . . , Ts − n + 1, . . . ,mvn−1) ≤ f(mv1 , . . . , 1, . . . ,mvn−1) and therefore the minimum
is reached for mvj = Ts − n + 1. From the set of constraints (cf. Relation (3)), if the
maximum of D(p(U)||q) is reached for mvj = Ts − n + 1 then
∑n
i=1,j 6=jmvi = n − 1 implies
that ∀i ∈ [1..n], i 6= j,mvi = 1, which concludes the proof. uunionsq
This allows us to formulate an upper-bound Dmax on the KL-divergence between the
uniform stream and any other stream:
Dmax = D(p(U)||q) = log
(
Ts
n
)
− 1
n
log (Ts − n+ 1) . (4)
Thus any input stream σ is Dmax-close (cf. Definition 5.2).
To determine the minimal effort that the adversary has to exert to bias the input stream
so that both uniformity and ergodicity properties do not hold, we use the Earth Mover’s
Distance (EMD) between the uniform distribution and the target one. In the following when
we say that the adversary replaces the node id vi by vj , we mean that he drops vi from the
input stream and inject vj instead.
Lemma 6.2 (Optimal strategy to maximize the divergence) Given an input stream
σ, replacing the less frequent id in σ with the most frequent one maximizes the gain in KL-
divergence with respect to the uniform distribution for the same amount of work as measured
by the EMD distance.
Proof. Given an input stream σ represented by the probability distribution q, we construct
the input stream σ′ from σ by substituting one occurrence of node id vi with node id vj so that
D(p(U)||q′) is maximized after this replacement (where q′ denote the probability distribution
representing σ′). This amounts to maximizing
[D(p(U)||q′)−D(p(U)||q)]. Recall that all node
ids in S must be present in σ′. Therefore, we search for the node id pair (vi, vj) such that
m′vj = mvj + 1
m′vi = mvi − 1
vj = arg maxvj∈S
(
log
(
1
q′vj
)
− log
(
1
qvj
))
vi = arg maxvi∈S
(
log
(
1
q′vi
)
− log
(
1
qvi
))
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leading to vj = arg maxvj∈S
(
1− 1mvj+1
)
= arg minvj∈S
1
mvj+1
= arg maxvj∈S mvj
vi = arg maxvi∈S
(
1 + 1mvi−1
)
= arg maxvi∈S
1
mvi−1 = arg minvi∈S mvi
Thus the optimal node id replacement that maximizes the KL-divergence gain is obtained by
replacing the less frequent node id vi with the most frequent one vj . uunionsq
Algorithm 1 shows an optimal implementation of Lemma 6.2 with respect to the number
of performed replacements. This algorithm is run by the adversary. Specifically, the inputs
of the algorithm are τs and an input stream σ that will feed the sampler component S
s
u of
node u. Recall that τs is the robustness threshold of the sampling strategy s implemented by
Ssu, i.e., for any τs-close input stream σ, the sampling strategy s is capable of outputting a
uniform and ergodic sample. The goal of the greedy Algorithm 1 is to tamper with the input
stream σ in order to increase its KL-divergence above τs with a minimum effort.
Algorithm 1: Adversary biasing strategy
Data: an input stream σ, the robustness threshold τs
Result: the number of replacements ` if it exists
if τs ≥ Dmax then1
return “fail”2
else3
`← 0;4
vj ← arg maxvj∈S mvj ;5
while
(D(p(U)||qσ) ≤ τs) do6
vi ← arg min{v∈S:mvi 6=1}mvi ;7
let k be the index of an id such that σ[k] = vi ;8
σ[k]← vj //one occurence of vi is dropped and vj is injected instead ;9
`← `+ 1;10
return `11
By assumption, the adversary is omniscient and therefore has the capacity to observe the
entire input stream σ. From Section 4, the adversary knows the strategy s of the sampler, and
thus can compute the value of τs. The value of the maximum divergence Dmax is computed
as Relation (4). If Dmax is greater than or equal to the robustness threshold, the algorithm
returns “fail”. Otherwise at each iteration, the adversary performs the optimal id replacement
until the KL-divergence exceeds the robustness threshold. Note that at lines (8) and (9) both
mvi and mvj are updated. The counter ` returned by Algorithm 1 represents the number of
replacements done by the adversary.
Consider s a sampling strategy, τs its robustness threshold, and σ an input stream. Let
` be the number of replacements executed in Algorithm 1. We denote qσ(`) the probability
distribution derived from σ after these ` optimal replacements.
Corollary 6.3 (Lower bound on the effort exerted by an omniscient adversary) The
minimum number of replacements an omniscient adversary has to apply to exceed τs is
δ = inf
{
` ∈ N : D(p(U)||qσ(`)) > τs
}
. (5)
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7 Blind Adversary Model
In this section, we study the behavior of a blind adversary, that is an adversary that only has
the capacity to observe messages sent or received by the nodes he controls. A strategy that
the adversary might apply to bias the input stream is to choose a node id (possibly one that
belongs to a malicious node but not necessarily) and to push it in the input stream as much
as possible.
We show that this strategy is optimal and we give the lower bound on the expected
minimum amount of work a blind adversary has to exert to bias the input stream.
Theorem 7.1 (Lower bound on the expected effort exerted by a blind adversary)
Let s be a sampling strategy, τs its robustness threshold and Ts the maximum convergence time
of s. The minimum number of replacements a blind adversary has to apply to exceed τs in
expectation is given when the input stream is the uniform one. We have
δ˜ = inf
{
` ∈ Is : 1
n
(⌊
`− 1⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋⌋ log(Ts
n
)
+ 2 log (Ts)− log (Ts + n`)
− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
> τs
}
(6)
where Is =
[
0..Ts − n+ 1−
⌊
Ts
n
⌋]
.
Proof. Let us consider the uniform node ids stream on a window of length Ts. For any
vi ∈ S, vi is present in the stream Ts/n in average. Thus the probability distribution p(U)
is such that ∀vi ∈ S, p(U)vi = 1/n. From the previous section, we have seen that the optimal
strategy for the adversary to bias an input stream is to replace the less frequent node id in
this stream with the most frequent one. By assumption, the adversary is blind and cannot
observe all the node ids of the input stream. Thus the strategy the adversary applies consists
choosing a specific node id vj and repeatedly pushes vj in the input stream. Let σ be an
input stream and σ′ be the stream obtained from σ after one step of this adversarial strategy
(i.e., replacing vi by vj for some vi ∈ S). We have
D(p(U)||qσ′)−D(p(U)||qσ) = 1
n
(
log
(
mvj
mvj + 1
)
+ log
(
mvi
mvi − 1
))
(7)
where qσ and qσ′ represent respectively the probability distributions of σ and σ
′. In the
following, qσ(`) denotes the probability distribution derived from σ after ` replacements. Given
a sampling strategy s, we prove by induction on the number of optimal replacements ` that,
starting from a uniform stream, the maximum KL-divergence after ` replacements is given by
D(p(U)||qσ(`)) =
1
n
(⌊
`− 1⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋⌋ log(Ts
n
)
+ 2 log (Ts)− log (Ts + n`)
− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
. (8)
Note that ` cannot be greater than
(
Ts − n+ 1−
⌊
Ts
n
⌋)
. Indeed, all node ids in the initial
uniform stream are present at least
⌊
Ts
n
⌋
times and the maximum number of times a unique
id can appear in the stream is (Ts − n+ 1).
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For ` = 1, the claim immediately holds from Equation 7. Now, assume that the claim also
holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ `. We show that the claim holds for k = `+ 1. The KL-divergence with
respect to the uniform stream after `+ 1 steps is
D(p(U)||qσ(`+1)) = D(p(U)||qσ(`)) +D(p(U)||qσ(`+1))−D(p(U)||qσ(`)). (9)
D(p(U)||qσ(`)) is given by Equation 8, and
(D(p(U)||qσ(`+1))−D(p(U)||qσ(`))) represents
the gain of step (` + 1). Two sub-cases need to be considered: (i) ` mod
⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋ 6= 0 and
(ii) ` mod
⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋
= 0.
Case (i): the less frequent node id vi in the stream at step ` + 1 is the same as the one
removed at step `. After ` steps, mvj =
Ts
n + ` and mvi =
Ts
n −
(
1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Tsn − 1⌋),
thus the right part of Equation 7 is equal to
1
n
(
log
(
Ts
n + `
Ts
n + `+ 1
)
+ log
(
Ts
n −
(
1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Tsn − 1⌋)
Ts
n −
(
1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Tsn − 1⌋)− 1
))
=
1
n
(
log (Ts + n`)− log (Ts + n(`+ 1)) + log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋))
− log
(
Ts − n
(
2 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
.
By assumption (i),
⌊
`−1
bTsn −1c
⌋
=
⌊
`
bTsn −1c
⌋
and
(
1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Tsn − 1⌋) = (` mod ⌊Tsn − 1⌋).
From Equation 9, we get
D(p(U)||qσ(`+1)) =
1
n
(⌊
`⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋⌋ log(Ts
n
)
+ 2 log (Ts)
− log (Ts + n(`+ 1))− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
,
which ends Case (i).
Case (ii). The argumentation is the same as above. However, as ` mod
⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋
= 0, the
node id that has been previously replaced is now present exactly once in the stream. Thus
the adversary needs to randomly choose another node id in the stream before processing the
next step of his strategy. Thus applying Equation 7 at step `+ 1 gives
D(p(U)||qσ(`+1))−D(p(U)||qσ(`)) =
1
n
(
log
(
Ts
n + `
Ts
n + `+ 1
)
+ log
(
Ts
n
Ts
n − 1
))
. (10)
By assumption
(
(`− 1) mod ⌊Tsn − 1⌋ = ⌊Tsn − 1⌋− 1), and by combining the induction hy-
pothesis 8 with the gain obtained at step `+ 1 (Equation 10) we get
D(p(U)||qσ(`+1)) =
1
n

⌊
`− 1⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋⌋ log(Ts
n
)
+ 3 log (Ts)
− log (Ts + n(`+ 1))− log (Ts − n)− log (n)
 .
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By assumption of the case we have
⌊
`
bTsn −1c
⌋
=
⌊
`−1
bTsn −1c
⌋
+ 1, which proves the induction:
D(p(U)||qσ(`+1)) =
1
n
(⌊
`⌊
Ts
n − 1
⌋⌋ log(Ts
n
)
+ 2 log (Ts)
− log (Ts + n(`+ 1))− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
.
As a conclusion, any value of ` that allows the adversary to exceed the robustness threshold
τs defeats the sampling strategy. Thus, the minimum number of replacement operations δ˜ is
the lower bound of this set of values. uunionsq
We now evaluate the minimum amount of work a blind adversary has to exert, in the worst
case, to bias the input stream. In the worst case, the node id vi the adversary has chosen to
blindly flood might be initially present only once in the input stream. In order to bias the
input stream, the adversary needs to push id vi sufficiently often so that the probability of
appearance of id vi reaches the uniform value, with respect to all the other node ids, and then
to continue to push this id δ˜ times so that the divergence between the resulting stream and
the uniform one is maximum.
Theorem 7.2 (Lower bound on the effort exerted by a blind adversary) Let s be a
sampling strategy, τs its robustness threshold and Ts the maximum convergence time of s. The
minimum number of replacements the adversary has to apply on a stream, in the worst case,
to exceed τs is
δ˜ +
⌈
Ts
n
⌉
− 1
Proof. The proof is immediate. First, the adversary has to raise the chosen id at least up
to the uniform value. As in the worst case, this id is present only once in the initial stream,
this costs
⌈
Ts
n
⌉− 1 replacements to reach a number of occurrences equals to ⌈Tsn ⌉. Moreover,
once this id is present in the modified stream
⌈
Ts
n
⌉
times, the adversarial follows the same
strategy as before, which requires δ˜ more steps to guarantee that the robustness threshold τs
is exceeded. Note that this value is a worst-case bound and not the exact minimum value with
respect to τs because after the first (
⌈
Ts
n
⌉ − 1) steps, the modified stream could be different
from the uniform one. In this situation, the KL-divergence to the uniform stream is strictly
greater than 0, reducing accordingly the amount of work of the adversary to exceed τs. uunionsq
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have focused on the problem of achieving uniform and ergodic peer sampling
in large scale open systems potentially populated with malicious peers. This problem consists
in guaranteeing that the knowledge of the system maintained by each honest peer is a uniform
and non permanent sample of the whole population of the system. By modeling input streams
as probability distributions, we have characterized the minimum effort (measured in terms of
node ids’ replacements) that an omniscient and a blind adversary have to exert on the input
stream of node identifiers to exceed the robustness threshold that quantifies the power of a
sampling strategy. Similarly to (pseudo)-random number generators that are considered as
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the basic mathematical tool to generate complex probability distributions, we believe that
uniform peer sampling should be regarded as a necessary building block to derive larger
classes of sampling schemes. This building block is of utmost importance in systems in
which the population is continuously evolving and thus, where it is impossible to capture the
full complexity of the network through global snapshots. In our context, this dynamicity is
exploited by the adversary to bias the peer sampling by over-representing targeted peers.
We conjecture that there exists a total order relationship on the power of ergodic (resp.
non ergodic) uniform sampling strategies with respect to their robustness threshold τ . This
can be depicted by using a planar representation as shown by Figure 2. Each τ -radius circle
in this picture represents the class of τ -close uniform sampling strategies. For instance, in
this representation the strategy proposed by Bortnikov et al. [6] belongs to the largest circle
corresponding to τ = ∞ on its non ergodic part (left side). As another illustrative example,
the sampling strategy proposed in Busnel et al. [7] should be ranked as less powerful than
the one proposed by Gurevich et al. [10] since the latter one achieves uniform and ergodic
sampling despite message loss contrary to the former one. Both strategies would appear in
the ergodic part of the representation (right side). Finally, we think that this classification
can be used as a tool to precisely compare any two sampling strategies as different as they are
(e.g., [4] and [17]). As future work, we intend to rank the state-the-art sampling algorithms
in the light of this new framework. Moreover, we plan to extend this work by integrating
other dimensions, such as space and time resources, and deterministic versus probabilistic
strategies.
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